Bitget x Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportArbitrum0xbeef…a518

Risk

Depositing into Bitget x Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$1.57mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $4.42mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $697,729

tap a preset or drag

Driven by wstETH $649,013 · weETH $44,312 · WETH $2,014 · other $2,391 · −100% $3.76m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHMarketChainlink$3.49m79% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $43,928

$3.53m80% of vault$3.49m79% of vault$43,928separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8e02…ae31Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$67.7m35 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: $3.53m · 80% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $649,013Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.53m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $43,928 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHMarketRedStone$238,1755% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $0.17

$238,1765% of vault$238,1755% of vault$0.17separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

weETH uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseRedStone market-rate feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x4e49…bc77RedStone

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$44.29m28 vaultsToken:0x3575…4dbeAllocation: $238,176 · 5% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $44,312Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $238,176 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $0.17 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$10,8230.2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $190.34

$11,0130.2% of vault$10,8230.2% of vault$190.34separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x282f…71a2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$62.78m34 vaultsToken:0x82af…bab1Allocation: $11,013 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $2,014Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $11,013 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $190.34 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

XAUt0MarketChainlink$9,6190.2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $187.75

$9,8070.2% of vault$9,6190.2% of vault$187.75separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xa576…bf8bChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2,2755 vaultsToken:0x4046…7159Allocation: $9,807 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $874.48Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9,807 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $187.75 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$8,1450.2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $124.65

$8,2700.2% of vault$8,1450.2% of vault$124.65separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8819…14d9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$62.68m36 vaultsToken:0x2f2a…5b0fAllocation: $8,270 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1,515Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8,270 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $124.65 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wsrUSDMarketChronicle / Chainlink$3.16<0.1% of vault · bad debt

$3.16<0.1% of vault$3.16<0.1% of vault—

What it's made of

Market· Chronicle / Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x77bd…06c3Chronicle / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$56,0444 vaultsToken:0x4809…d75dAllocation: $3.16 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $0.74Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.16 · inherits vault-wide stress

Unallocatednot lent into any market — no collateral exposure$615,369 · 14%

$615,36914% of vault——

+4 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to$44,431drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 1% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / Chronicle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, wsrUSD, XAUt0, WBTC, siUSD, sUSDS, WETH, PT-USDai-18JUN20260x2f3b…d3c5$44,431 · 1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices weETH0x3c8b…fe4f$0.17 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$4.42m	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	$697,729	up to $3.76m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	$697,729	up to $3.76m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	$697,729	up to $3.76m	Instant
	16%	$697,729	up to $3.76m	Instant
	16%	$697,729	up to $3.76m	Instant
	—	—	up to $44,431	Instant
	0%	$0	$0	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $2.21m	7 days

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0xca9f…f5ee

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels1 · 1 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x1b54…8f14

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x2570…f462
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit · 11 things this pool relies on but doesn't control — select one for its story

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 16 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Bitget x Steakhouse USDC

Risk

Collateral & oracles

Oracle dependencies

How you could lose money

Who you're trusting

Market Specific oracle