Bitget x Steakhouse USDC (Arbitrum) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 16% of deposit

Driven by wstETH −30% 14% · XAUt0 −30% <1% · WETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHMarketChainlink77%of vault · bad debt · $595,675Oracle exposure 9%

86%of vault · $662,28677%of vault · $595,6759%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8e02…ae31Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$59.58m12 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: 86% of the vault · $662,286

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 14% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $662,286 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

XAUt0MarketChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $80,462Oracle exposure 1%

12%of vault · $89,34610%of vault · $80,4621%separate path

What it's made of

XAUt0 token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xa576…bf8bChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$12,6875 vaultsToken:0x4046…7159Allocation: 12% of the vault · $89,346

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1.0% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $89,346 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $15,904Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $17,6672%of vault · $15,9040.2%separate path

What it's made of

WETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x282f…71a2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$55.14m10 vaultsToken:0x82af…bab1Allocation: 2% of the vault · $17,667

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $17,667 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+7 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $77,257

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / Chronicle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, wsrUSD, WBTC, XAUt0, WETH, siUSD, sUSDS, PT-USDai-18JUN20260x2f3b…d3c510% of vault · $77,257drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0xca9f…f5ee

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0xca9f…f5ee

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x2570…f462
contract0x85b6…3704
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

11 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.