⌘K

Steakhouse High Yield AUSD

Risk reportMonad0xbeef…060d

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield AUSD means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

22%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 8% of deposit

Driven by WBTC −30% 5% · WMON −30% 2% · WETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 57% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChronicle26%of vault · bad debt · $19,832Oracle exposure 31%

57%of vault · $42,79826%of vault · $19,83231%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chronicle market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChronicle market-rate feed pathQuoteChronicle quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xda77…c73cChronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$180,2207 vaultsToken:0x0555…2b9cAllocation: 57% of the vault · $42,798

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $42,798 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 31% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WMONMarketChronicle20%of vault · bad debt · $14,985Oracle exposure 3%

23%of vault · $17,55820%of vault · $14,9853%separate path

What it's made of

WMON token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD77% LLTV0x409b…02efChronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$617,9306 vaultsToken:0x3bd3…433aAllocation: 23% of the vault · $17,558

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $17,558 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChronicle5%of vault · bad debt · $3,581Oracle exposure 5%

9%of vault · $7,0725%of vault · $3,5815%separate path

What it's made of

WETH token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xd8a9…76a3Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$79,1707 vaultsToken:0xee8c…1242Allocation: 9% of the vault · $7,072

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7,072 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

XAUt0MarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $2,363Oracle exposure 2%

6%of vault · $4,1873%of vault · $2,3632%separate path

What it's made of

XAUt0 token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD77% LLTV0x0d57…4a44Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$32,3064 vaultsToken:0x01bf…1071Allocation: 6% of the vault · $4,187

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4,187 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChronicle2%of vault · bad debt · $1,830Oracle exposure 2%

5%of vault · $3,6112%of vault · $1,8302%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chronicle market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChronicle market-rate feed pathQuoteChronicle quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xe6e7…a2c4Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$8.87m9 vaultsToken:0x10ae…5417Allocation: 5% of the vault · $3,611

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3,611 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+6 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to43%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $32,634

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chronicle·a control contractprices WMON, wstETH, WETH, WBTC, wsrUSD0xb3bf…47b041% of vault · $30,810drainable if it is compromised
Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices syrupUSDC, XAUt0, AA_FalconXUSDC0x7387…c4f12% of vault · $1,824drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	8%	up to 57%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	8%	up to 57%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(3)
	8%	up to 57%	Instant
	8%	up to 57%	Instant
	—	up to 43%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x7bbc…49ba

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x0a50…a662
contract0x7352…5bdc
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xe27f…e558

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 56min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse High Yield AUSD

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle