Steakhouse Prime USDC
Risk reportKatana0xbeef…62d7
Risk
Depositing into Steakhouse Prime USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by vbWBTC −30% 4% · vbETH −30% 1% · −100% 28% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
vbWBTCMarketChainlink21%of vault · bad debt · $313,652.18Oracle exposure 2%23%of vault · $349,496.7121%of vault · $313,652.182%separate path
vbWBTCMarketChainlink21%of vault · bad debt · $313,652.18Oracle exposure 2%What it's made of
vbWBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → vbUSDC86% LLTV0xb60f…040eChainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultvbETHMarketChainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $99,221.06Oracle exposure 0.7%7%of vault · $110,213.747%of vault · $99,221.060.7%separate path
vbETHMarketChainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $99,221.06Oracle exposure 0.7%What it's made of
vbETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → vbUSDC86% LLTV0xd423…bf47Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultOracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to3%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $46,837.21
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices vbWBTC, vbETH0x0787…33343% of vault · $46,837.21drainable if it is compromised
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 5% | up to 28% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 5% | up to 28% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | ||||
| 5% | up to 28% | Instant | ||
| 5% | up to 28% | Instant | ||
| 5% | up to 28% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 3% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 7 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 7 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Sentinels1 · 1 contractSafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- contract0xcd84…1017
Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- 1-of-3 multisig0x0000…9da8
- contract0xce97…91ff
- single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Dependencies that can affect your deposit
9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.