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Smokehouse USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…f5bc

Risk

Depositing into Smokehouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 19% of deposit

Driven by mF-ONE −30% 7% · PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 5% · weETH −30% 4% · other 4% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

mF-ONEMarket30%of vault · bad debt · $3.71mOracle exposure 3%

33%of vault · $4.13m30%of vault · $3.71m3%separate path

What it's made of

mF-ONE token page

Market(composite)

mF-ONE is priced via mF-ONE/USD Discounted — market-rate feed.

BasemF-ONE/USD DiscountedMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x0cb1…eb78

Room to grow: $4.13m of $30m cap (14% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.36m14 vaultsToken:0x238a…66baAllocation: 33% of the vault · $4.13m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 7% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.13m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate22%of vault · bad debt · $2.7mOracle exposure 3%

25%of vault · $3.13m22%of vault · $2.7m3%separate path

What it's made of

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Room to grow: $3.13m of $10m cap (31% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$19m22 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 25% of the vault · $3.13m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.13m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHMarketChainlink / RedStone20%of vault · bad debt · $2.48mOracle exposure 2%

22%of vault · $2.75m20%of vault · $2.48m2%separate path

What it's made of

weETH token page

Market· Chainlink / RedStone(composite, aggregator)

weETH is priced via Redstone Price Feed — market-rate feed (RedStone).

BaseRedstone Price FeedMarketRedStone

Markets this collateral backs · 3

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x5635…6a68RedStone

Room to grow: $2.75m of $59.99m cap (5% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$366.29m51 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: 22% of the vault · $2.75m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 3 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $2.75m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $1.27mOracle exposure 1%

11%of vault · $1.41m10%of vault · $1.27m1%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

cbBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink

Room to grow: $1.41m of $99.99m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$449.92m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 11% of the vault · $1.41m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1.41m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid4%of vault · bad debt · $469,915Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $522,4354%of vault · $469,9150.4%separate path

What it's made of

reUSD token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Room to grow: $522,435 of $20m cap (3% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.24m21 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 4% of the vault · $522,435

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $522,435 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wFalconXHybrid3%of vault · bad debt · $402,731Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $446,9893%of vault · $402,7310.4%separate path

What it's made of

wFalconX token page

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Room to grow: $446,989 of $10m cap (4% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.82m12 vaultsToken:0x4614…8644Allocation: 4% of the vault · $446,989

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $446,989 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

steakEURCVMarketChainlink0.8%of vault · bad debt · $99,740Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.9%of vault · $110,7380.8%of vault · $99,7400.1%separate path

What it's made of

steakEURCV token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf3ef…b0f6Chainlink

Room to grow: $110,738 of $10m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.19m4 vaultsToken:0xbeef…db2fAllocation: 0.9% of the vault · $110,738

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $110,738 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $12,232Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $13,5870.1%of vault · $12,232<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink

Room to grow: $13,587 of $49.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$837.66m108 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $13,587

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $13,587 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+9 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.37m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LBTC, wstETH, TSLAon, FLHYon, WETH, weETH, stcUSD, tBTC, steakEURCV, USCC, PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026, PT-USDG-24SEP20260x21f7…73ca3% of vault · $425,984drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC, weETH, stcUSD0x6906…44722% of vault · $273,192drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices mF-ONE, PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, wFalconX7% of vault · $895,579mispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD<1% of vault · $52,520mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	19%	up to 89%	Instant
	19%	up to 89%	Instant
	6%	up to 51%	Instant
	10%	up to 45%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	up to 38%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0x94aa…27d3

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xbeef…beef
single key (EOA)0x7a17…4e8d
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
contract0x9e91…f9e1
1-of-5 multisig0x29d4…74f7
contract0xfd32…c75d
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 49min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Smokehouse USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle