⌘K

Clearstar USDC Core

Risk reportEthereum0x69a2…c284

Risk

Depositing into Clearstar USDC Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

40%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 21% of deposit

Driven by mF-ONE −30% 8% · PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 6% · fxSAVE −30% 5% · other 2% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

mF-ONEMarket32%of vault · bad debt · $1.03mOracle exposure 4%

36%of vault · $1.17m32%of vault · $1.03m4%separate path

What it's made of

mF-ONE token page

Market(composite)

mF-ONE is priced via mF-ONE/USD Discounted — market-rate feed.

BasemF-ONE/USD DiscountedMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x0cb1…eb78

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.13m14 vaultsToken:0x238a…66baAllocation: 36% of the vault · $1.17m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.17m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate27%of vault · bad debt · $882,424Oracle exposure 5%

31%of vault · $1.03m27%of vault · $882,4245%separate path

What it's made of

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$22.26m22 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 31% of the vault · $1.03m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.03m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

fxSAVEHybrideOracle20%of vault · bad debt · $640,869Oracle exposure 2%

22%of vault · $710,39520%of vault · $640,8692%separate path

What it's made of

fxSAVE token page

Hybrid· eOracle(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC92% LLTV0x1693…4440eOracle
→ USDC86% LLTV0x1693…4440eOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.21m7 vaultsToken:0x7743…fc39Allocation: 22% of the vault · $710,395

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $710,395 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSNHybridStork / Chainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $223,474Oracle exposure 0.7%

8%of vault · $246,9847%of vault · $223,4740.7%separate path

What it's made of

sUSN token page

Hybrid· Stork / Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSN mixes exchange-rate/NAV (A port of a chainlink aggregator powered by Stork, ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDC / USD) — insulated from A port of a chainlink aggregator powered by Stork, ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDC / USD.

BaseA port of a chainlink aggregator powered by StorkNAVQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 23hDeviation 25bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xc415…94aaStork / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$118,8823 vaultsToken:0xe24a…b91dAllocation: 8% of the vault · $246,984

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $246,984 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

siUSDHybrid3%of vault · bad debt · $104,336Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $117,2493%of vault · $104,3360.4%separate path

What it's made of

siUSD token page

Hybrid(composite)

siUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Chainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT Oracle, Dummy feed with 12 decimals, ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseChainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT OracleNAVQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAVBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xd2cc…fa6d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.7m18 vaultsToken:0xdbdc…9bcbAllocation: 4% of the vault · $117,249

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $117,249 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

OETHMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $3,168Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $3,5200.1%of vault · $3,168<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

OETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

OETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 23hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe8ad…edb0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.01m7 vaultsToken:0x856c…8dc3Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $3,520

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3,520 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-14JAN2027Unclassified0.1%of vault · bad debt · $2,473Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $2,8420.1%of vault · $2,473<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USDat-14JAN2027 token page

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x034f…2dad

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.43m10 vaultsToken:0xba96…314fAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $2,842

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2,842 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid0.1%of vault · bad debt · $2,451Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $2,7150.1%of vault · $2,451<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

AA_FalconXUSDC token page

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$677,58217 vaultsToken:0xc26a…f99cAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $2,715

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2,715 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+6 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

3 feeds2 control points

Up to12%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $395,875

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

eOracle·a control contractprices fxSAVE0x9b54…dda42% of vault · $69,526drainable if it is compromised
Chainlink / Stork·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, OETH, sUSN0x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $23,862drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices mF-ONE, PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, siUSD, PT-USDat-14JAN2027, AA_FalconXUSDC, wFalconX, PT-fxSAVE-29OCT20269% of vault · $302,234mispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD, srRoyUSDC<1% of vault · $253.11mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	21%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	21%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	21%	up to 90%	Instant
	21%	up to 90%	Instant
	6%	up to 43%	Instant
	8%	up to 38%	Instant
	—	up to 12%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner3-of-6 multisig0xb3cf…2b44

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x5634…fc24

Sentinels11 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x491d…1516

Allocators22 multisigsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x40dd…b48f
1-of-4 multisig0xc2bf…4ca6

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

1 reading could not be refreshed this run.

Updated 3min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Clearstar USDC Core

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle