Clearstar USDC Core

Risk reportEthereum0x69a2…c284

Risk

Depositing into Clearstar USDC Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

40%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 20% of deposit

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 9% · fxSAVE −30% 5% · sUSN −30% 4% · other 2% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate38%of vault · bad debt · $721,383Oracle exposure 4%

42%of vault · $793,27838%of vault · $721,3834%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$9.75m18 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 42% of the vault · $793,278

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $793,278 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSNHybridStork / Chainlink21%of vault · bad debt · $398,596Oracle exposure 2%

23%of vault · $441,30121%of vault · $398,5962%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Stork / Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSN mixes exchange-rate/NAV (A port of a chainlink aggregator powered by Stork, ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDC / USD) — insulated from A port of a chainlink aggregator powered by Stork, ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDC / USD.

BaseA port of a chainlink aggregator powered by StorkNAVQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 23h · Deviation 25bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xc415…94aaStork / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$130,9243 vaultsToken:0xe24a…b91dAllocation: 23% of the vault · $441,301

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $441,301 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

fxSAVEHybrideOracle21%of vault · bad debt · $390,137Oracle exposure 2%

23%of vault · $433,71621%of vault · $390,1372%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· eOracle(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC92% LLTV0x1693…4440eOracle
→ USDC86% LLTV0x1693…4440eOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.26m7 vaultsToken:0x7743…fc39Allocation: 23% of the vault · $433,716

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $433,716 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

srRoyUSDCHybrid10%of vault · bad debt · $188,606Oracle exposure 2%

12%of vault · $221,78610%of vault · $188,6062%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

srRoyUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x86a8…6ab0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$288,5314 vaultsToken:0xcd9f…2a32Allocation: 12% of the vault · $221,786

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $221,786 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mF-ONEMarket0.1%of vault · bad debt · $961.56Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $1,1140.1%of vault · $961.56<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market(composite)

mF-ONE is priced via mF-ONE/USD Discounted — market-rate feed.

BasemF-ONE/USD DiscountedMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x0cb1…eb78

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.58m14 vaultsToken:0x238a…66baAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $1,114

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,114 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $555.84Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $617.60<0.1%of vault · $555.84<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.41m21 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $617.60

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $617.60 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+8 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

3 feeds · 2 control points

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $191,573

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

eOracle·a control contractprices fxSAVE0x9b54…dda42% of vault · $43,579drainable if it is compromised
Chainlink / Stork·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, OETH, sUSN0x21f7…73ca2% of vault · $42,705drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, mF-ONE, AA_FalconXUSDC4% of vault · $72,048mispriceable if these feeds lie
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices srRoyUSDC, reUSD2% of vault · $33,241mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
	8%	up to 77%	Instant
	15%	up to 69%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×8— applies in 2 days; time to exit first

Owner3-of-6 multisig0xb3cf…2b44

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x5634…fc24

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x491d…1516

Allocators2 · 2 multisigsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x40dd…b48f
1-of-4 multisig0xc2bf…4ca6

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 53min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Clearstar USDC Core

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle