Felix USDC V2
Risk reportHyperliquid L10x5125…be8b
Risk
Depositing into Felix USDC V2 means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by WHYPE −30% 3% · kHYPE −30% 1% · wstHYPE −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 83% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
kHYPEMarketRedStone44%of vault · bad debt · $3.54mOracle exposure 14%57%of vault · $4.69m44%of vault · $3.54m14%separate path
kHYPEMarketRedStone44%of vault · bad debt · $3.54mOracle exposure 14%What it's made of
kHYPE uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → USDC63% LLTV0xe876…8469RedStone
- → USDC77% LLTV0x3939…5283RedStone
If it breaks
−30% defaultWHYPEMarketRedStone32%of vault · bad debt · $2.61mOracle exposure 3%35%of vault · $2.86m32%of vault · $2.61m3%separate path
WHYPEMarketRedStone32%of vault · bad debt · $2.61mOracle exposure 3%What it's made of
WHYPE uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → USDC77% LLTV0x194f…4f31RedStone
- → USDC63% LLTV0x194f…4f31RedStone
If it breaks
−30% defaultwstHYPEHybridRedStone3%of vault · bad debt · $206,857.85Oracle exposure 0.8%3%of vault · $274,911.333%of vault · $206,857.850.8%separate path
wstHYPEHybridRedStone3%of vault · bad debt · $206,857.85Oracle exposure 0.8%What it's made of
Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → USDC77% LLTV0xf2cb…eb61RedStone
- → USDC63% LLTV0x7f95…92acRedStone
If it breaks
−30% defaultPT-kHYPE-24SEP2026HybridRedStone2%of vault · bad debt · $199,880.662%of vault · $199,880.662%of vault · $199,880.66—
PT-kHYPE-24SEP2026HybridRedStone2%of vault · bad debt · $199,880.66What it's made of
Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x50c9…5ac9RedStone
If it breaks
−30% defaultUBTCMarketRedStone2%of vault · bad debt · $125,845.21Oracle exposure 0.5%2%of vault · $162,214.022%of vault · $125,845.210.5%separate path
UBTCMarketRedStone2%of vault · bad debt · $125,845.21Oracle exposure 0.5%What it's made of
Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x6df6…1c29RedStone
If it breaks
−30% defaultOracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to19%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.51m
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices UBTC, kHYPE, WHYPE, wstHYPE, PT-kHYPE-24SEP20260xce77…30cf19% of vault · $1.51mdrainable if it is compromised
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(3) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 5% | up to 83% | Instant | ||
| 5% | up to 83% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 5% | up to 83% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | ||||
| 3% | up to 67% | Instant | ||
| 5% | up to 52% | Instant | ||
| 10% | up to 40% | Instant | ||
| <1% | up to 30% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 19% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 3 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- single key (EOA)0xdd00…8f6c
Allocators2 · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0xdd00…8f6c
- single key (EOA)0xf81c…38ed
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Dependencies that can affect your deposit
8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.