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Gauntlet USDC Frontier

Risk reportBase0x2369…e890

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Frontier means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

18%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

absorbed by liquidations — no bad debt

−100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

SOLMarketChainlink43%of vault · bad debt · $47,764Oracle exposure 4%

47%of vault · $52,50643%of vault · $47,7644%separate path

What it's made of

SOL token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

SOL is priced via SOL / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseSOL / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xe972…5dc7Chainlink

Room to grow: $52,506 of $999,688 cap (5% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$703,9306 vaultsToken:0x3119…cf82Allocation: 47% of the vault · $52,506

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $52,506 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbXRPMarketChainlink30%of vault · bad debt · $33,393Oracle exposure 3%

33%of vault · $36,87730%of vault · $33,3933%separate path

What it's made of

cbXRP token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Room to grow: $36,877 of $5m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$6.34m15 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 33% of the vault · $36,877

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $36,877 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbADAMarketChainlink18%of vault · bad debt · $20,178Oracle exposure 2%

20%of vault · $22,35018%of vault · $20,1782%separate path

What it's made of

cbADA token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbADA is priced via ADA / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseADA / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x35d8…e45fChainlink

Room to grow: $22,350 of $999,688 cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.41m10 vaultsToken:0xcbad…7b8cAllocation: 20% of the vault · $22,350

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $22,350 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

JitoSOLHybridChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $14.95Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $16.47<0.1%of vault · $14.95<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

JitoSOL token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink

Room to grow: $16.47 of $999,688 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$622,4039 vaultsToken:0x97be…34deAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $16.47

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $16.47 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+7 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $10,399

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, cbXRP, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH, cbADA, cbDOGE, cbLTC, SOL, LBTC, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b9% of vault · $10,399drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	0%	up to 91%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	0%	up to 91%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	0%	up to 91%	Instant
	0%	up to 91%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
	0%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xa090…0467
single key (EOA)0xd196…919a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

11 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 50min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC Frontier

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle