Sentora RLUSD Main

Risk reportEthereum0x6dc5…e6bf

Risk

Depositing into Sentora RLUSD Main means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$100.81mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $279.27mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $45.5m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by kBTC $24.18m · weETH $12.68m · syrupUSDC $4.03m · other $4.6m · −100% $239.1m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

kBTCMarketChainlink$129.97m47% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $13.61m

$143.59m51% of vault$129.97m47% of vault$13.61mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

kBTC is priced via BTC / USD, quoted in RLUSD / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD86% LLTV0xbcc3…5ddbChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$23.39m7 vaultsToken:0x73e0…db98Allocation: $143.59m · 51% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $24.18mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $143.59m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $13.61m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink$68.18m24% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $8.36m

$76.54m27% of vault$68.18m24% of vault$8.36mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH / ETH) with market-rate (ETH / USD, RLUSD / USD) — insulated from weETH / ETH market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, RLUSD / USD.

BaseweETH / ETHExchange rateChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD86% LLTV0x6ab3…110bChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$302.63m106 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: $76.54m · 27% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $12.68mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $76.54m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $8.36m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

syrupUSDCHybridChainlink$17.15m6% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.87m

$19.02m7% of vault$17.15m6% of vault$1.87mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

syrupUSDC mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDC / USD, RLUSD / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDC / USD, RLUSD / USD.

BaseUSDC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 30bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD92% LLTV0xf766…c1b5Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$15.3m24 vaultsToken:0x80ac…cc0bAllocation: $19.02m · 7% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $4.03mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $19.02m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.87m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink$16.18m6% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.78m

$17.96m6% of vault$16.18m6% of vault$1.78mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via cbBTC / USD, quoted in RLUSD / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BasecbBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 200bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD86% LLTV0x8b36…45bdChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$256.58m148 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $17.96m · 6% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $3.01mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $17.96m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.78m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDE-13AUG2026HybridPTMarket rateChainlink$3.58m1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $192,520.31

$3.78m1% of vault$3.58m1% of vault$192,520.31separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-sUSDE-13AUG2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle, quoted via RLUSD / USD.

BasePendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAVUSDe / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD92% LLTV0x968e…62d7Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$192,564.623 vaultsToken:0x5a19…2bbbAllocation: $3.78m · 1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $841,976.67Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.78m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $192,520.31 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$2.26m0.8% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $244,410.92

$2.5m0.9% of vault$2.26m0.8% of vault$244,410.92separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in RLUSD / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD86% LLTV0xf587…7e8dChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$390.41m146 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: $2.5m · 0.9% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $419,643.39Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.5m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $244,410.92 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink$1.77m0.6% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $194,701.17

$1.97m0.7% of vault$1.77m0.6% of vault$194,701.17separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in RLUSD / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteRLUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ RLUSD86% LLTV0x4e58…1653Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$758.92m165 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: $1.97m · 0.7% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $329,953.56Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.97m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $194,701.17 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $13.97m idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure$13.92m · 5%

$13.92m5% of vault——

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$26.25mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 9% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, weETH, kBTC, syrupUSDC, PT-sUSDE-13AUG20260x21f7…73ca$26.25m · 9% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$279.27m	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	$45.5m	up to $239.1m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	$45.5m	up to $239.1m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	$45.5m	up to $239.1m	Instant
	16%	$45.5m	up to $239.1m	Instant
	4%	$10.42m	up to $99.34m	Instant
	6%	$17.56m	up to $88.92m	Instant
	—	—	up to $26.25m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $139.64m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies in 3 days; time to exit first

Owner1-of-1 multisig0xe8c9…8008

Curator1-of-1 multisig0x9e39…aac0

Sentinels3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0x13de…90e1
single key (EOA)0x74d1…1618
1-of-1 multisig0x9e39…aac0

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x13de…90e1
1-of-1 multisig0x9e39…aac0
single key (EOA)0xc4ba…79d3

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

7 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Jul 28, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql