Grove x Steakhouse AUSD

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…a98a

Risk

Depositing into Grove x Steakhouse AUSD means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

43%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 14-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 22% of deposit

Driven by syrupUSDC −30% 22% · sUSDS −30% <1% · wstETH −30% <1% · −100% 94% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

syrupUSDCHybrid93%of vault · bad debt · $5.14mOracle exposure 6%

99%of vault · $5.46m93%of vault · $5.14m6%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

syrupUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD92% LLTV0xea87…09bc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$13.87m23 vaultsToken:0x80ac…cc0bAllocation: 99% of the vault · $5.46m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 22% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5.46m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHybridChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $77,702.97Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $81,578.111%of vault · $77,702.970.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite, managed)

sUSDS uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD95% LLTV0x954f…f230Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$7.91m22 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: 1% of the vault · $81,578.11

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $81,578.11 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1,039.37Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $1,096.66<0.1%of vault · $1,039.37<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ AUSD86% LLTV0x038c…7a03Chainlink
→ AUSD86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$751.46m165 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $1,096.66

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1,096.66 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+4 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to6%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $322,180.72

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, weETH, sUSDS0x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $3,932.43drainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices syrupUSDC6% of vault · $318,248.29mispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	22%	up to 94%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	22%	up to 94%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	6%	Full deposit	Instant
	22%	up to 94%	Instant
	22%	up to 94%	Instant
	22%	up to 94%	Instant
	—	up to 6%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	14 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	14 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 14 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-2 multisig0xd700…5427

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels1 · 1 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x1369…91ba

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0xaad8…35e7
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

7 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 15, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql