Risk
Depositing into Metronome msETH Vault means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by ynETHx $452,631 · weETH $451,303 · rswETH $249,214 · −100% $4.81m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
ynETHxHybrid$1.93m37% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $214,011$2.14m40% of vault$1.93m37% of vault$214,011separate path
ynETHx is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → msETH92% LLTV0xc28f…b22d
weETHHybrid$1.92m37% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $202,815$2.12m40% of vault$1.92m37% of vault$202,815separate path
weETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (weETH/ETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → msETH92% LLTV0xbdd2…8a72
rswETHHybrid$961,25519% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $105,765$1.07m20% of vault$961,25519% of vault$105,765separate path
rswETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (rswETH/ETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → msETH95% LLTV0x56e2…bd9b
Oracle dependencies
Up to$522,592drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices ynETHx, weETH, rswETH$522,592 · 10% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $5.16m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 22% | $1.15m | up to $4.81m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 22% | $1.15m | up to $4.81m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 22% | $1.15m | up to $4.81m | Instant | ||
| 22% | $1.15m | up to $4.81m | Instant | ||
| 22% | $1.15m | up to $4.81m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $522,592 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $2.58m | 3 days | ||
| — | — | $0 | Instant | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- contract0xfd32…c75d
- single key (EOA)0x9ace…beb1
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.
This pool wasn't refreshed in the latest run — showing the last-known-good snapshot from 13 Jul, 2026.