Saturn USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xabe4…7240

Risk

Depositing into Saturn USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

35%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026 −30% 9% · PT-USDat-27AUG2026 −30% 9% · sUSDat −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 77% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged37%of vault · bad debt · $552,611.34Oracle exposure 3%

41%of vault · $600,664.4137%of vault · $552,611.343%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x4fcf…bb39

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$103,077.273 vaultsToken:0xc689…84f7Allocation: 41% of the vault · $600,664.41

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $600,664.41 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged37%of vault · bad debt · $552,266.82Oracle exposure 5%

42%of vault · $623,466.937%of vault · $552,266.825%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-USDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xda25…64cd

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$333,879.127 vaultsToken:0x1d69…1e08Allocation: 42% of the vault · $623,466.9

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $623,466.9 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDatHybrideOracle1%of vault · bad debt · $22,218.04Oracle exposure 0.1%

2%of vault · $23,636.011%of vault · $22,218.040.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· eOracle(managed)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x5228…461deOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$690,141.865 vaultsToken:0xd166…2df7Allocation: 2% of the vault · $23,636.01

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $23,636.01 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged0.5%of vault · bad debt · $8,108.07Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.6%of vault · $8,998.850.5%of vault · $8,108.070.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x3296…32d7

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2,326.163 vaultsToken:0x2d43…82b4Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $8,998.85

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8,998.85 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDat-14JAN2027Unclassified<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.00092Oracle exposure 3%

3%of vault · $49,987.73<0.1%of vault · $0.000923%separate path

What it's made of

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf8d5…dc4d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$49,986.662 vaultsToken:0x0b98…0517Allocation: 3% of the vault · $49,987.73

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $49,987.73 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-14JAN2027Unclassified<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.00091Oracle exposure 3%

3%of vault · $49,987.73<0.1%of vault · $0.000913%separate path

What it's made of

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x034f…2dad

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$49,986.662 vaultsToken:0xba96…314fAllocation: 3% of the vault · $49,987.73

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $49,987.73 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $125,178.57 idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure8% · $125,102.37

8%of vault · $125,102.37——

Oracle dependencies

1 feed

Up to15%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $221,537.35

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

eOracle· on-chain control not resolvedprices sUSDat<1% of vault · $1,417.97mispriceable if this feed lies
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026, PT-USDat-27AUG2026, PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026, PT-sUSDat-14JAN2027, PT-USDat-14JAN202715% of vault · $220,119.38mispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 77%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 77%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	8%	up to 85%	Instant
	18%	up to 77%	Instant
	18%	up to 77%	Instant
	18%	up to 77%	Instant
	—	up to 15%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x677f…b78f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

6 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 19, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql