Yearn OG USDT

Risk reportKatana0x8ed6…1d47

Risk

Depositing into Yearn OG USDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$298,805realistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $723,133Smart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $129,564

tap a preset or drag

Driven by vbETH $125,358 · BTC.b $3,387 · weETH $818.47 · −100% $722,701 modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

vbETHMarketChainlink$673,80193% of vault · bad debt

$673,80193% of vault$673,80193% of vault—

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDT86% LLTV0x2477…f084Chainlink

Room to grow: $673,801 of $3m cap (22% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$310,68416 vaultsToken:0xee7d…ab62Allocation: $673,801 · 93% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $125,358Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $673,801 · inherits vault-wide stress

BTC.bMarketRedStone$37,2555% of vault · bad debt

$37,2555% of vault$37,2555% of vault—

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDT77% LLTV0x83f4…719fRedStone

Room to grow: $37,255 of $499,296 cap (7% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$16 vaultsToken:0xb0f7…7072Allocation: $37,255 · 5% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $3,387Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $37,255 · inherits vault-wide stress

weETHHybridRedStone / Chainlink$9,0031% of vault · bad debt

$9,0031% of vault$9,0031% of vault—

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ vbUSDT77% LLTV0xe892…8364RedStone / Chainlink
→ vbUSDT86% LLTV0xe892…8364RedStone / Chainlink

Room to grow: $9,003 of $2.5m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.91m20 vaultsToken:0x9893…19a7Allocation: $9,003 · 1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $818.47Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $9,003 · inherits vault-wide stress

avKATHybridChainlink$2,3230.3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure < $0.0001

$2,3230.3% of vault$2,3230.3% of vault< $0.0001separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

avKAT is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg rather than a direct market-rate feed.

BaseExchange-rate/NAV pricing legQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDT63% LLTV0x1ca5…6de2Chainlink

Room to grow: $2,323 of $748,943 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$44,9557 vaultsToken:0x7231…fcebAllocation: $2,323 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2,323 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to < $0.0001 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

KATMarketChainlink$317.99<0.1% of vault · bad debt

$317.99<0.1% of vault$317.99<0.1% of vault—

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDT63% LLTV0x2787…ebe8Chainlink

Room to grow: $317.99 of $998,591 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1,5925 vaultsToken:0x7f1f…dc2dAllocation: $317.99 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $317.99 · inherits vault-wide stress

+4 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to< $0.0001drainable if these feeds are mispriced · <1% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices KAT, vbWBTC, avKAT, weETH, vbETH, yvvbUSDC, PT-yvvbUSDC(vbUSDC)-2026/08/020x0787…3334< $0.0001 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$723,133	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	$129,564	Full deposit	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	$129,564	Full deposit	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	$129,564	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	$129,564	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	$129,564	Full deposit	Instant
	<1%	$818.47	up to $11,326	Instant
	—	—	up to < $0.0001	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $361,567	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x518c…0149

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x90d0…6b51

Guardian3-of-5 multisig0xe6ad…7162

Allocators4 · 2 contracts · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xffb8…0862
contract0x39eb…2412
single key (EOA)0x75a1…780d
single key (EOA)0x50b7…a8fa

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0x18b8…5d7c

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 20 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql