Ethena x Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportBase0xbeef…739e

Risk

Depositing into Ethena x Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$28.3mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $79.86mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $12.22m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by cbBTC $7.58m · USDe $4.62m · cbETH $16,919 · −100% $71.91m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink$40.74m51% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $4.44m

$45.19m57% of vault$40.74m51% of vault$4.44mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$186.77m73 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $45.19m · 57% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $7.58mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $45.19m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $4.44m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USDeHybridChainlink$19.67m25% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $2.1m

$21.76m27% of vault$19.67m25% of vault$2.1mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

USDe uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf4b1…9a47Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$25.38m4 vaultsToken:0x5d3a…ef34Allocation: $21.76m · 27% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $4.62mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $21.76m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $2.1m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbXRPMarketChainlink$11.31m14% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.4m

$12.71m16% of vault$11.31m14% of vault$1.4mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.48m12 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: $12.71m · 16% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $12.71m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.4m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink$186,1120.2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $20,306

$206,4180.3% of vault$186,1120.2% of vault$20,306separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$19.27m67 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: $206,418 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $16,919Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $206,418 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $20,306 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$7.96mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, cbBTC, cbETH, USDe0xf0db…5b1b$7.96m · 10% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$79.86m	Full deposit	Instant
	15%	$12.22m	up to $71.91m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	15%	$12.22m	up to $71.91m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	15%	$12.22m	up to $71.91m	Instant
	15%	$12.22m	up to $71.91m	Instant
	15%	$12.22m	up to $60.6m	Instant
	6%	$4.62m	up to $19.67m	Instant
	—	—	up to $7.96m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $39.93m	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0x639b…c5d6

Curator2-of-6 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x1be9…0e36
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql