Risk
Depositing into Clearstar Core USDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by vbWBTC $125,805 · weETH $96,610 · −100% $1.2m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
vbWBTCMarketChainlink$676,20135% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $464,026$1.14m59% of vault$676,20135% of vault$464,026separate path
vbWBTCMarketChainlink$676,20135% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $464,026vbWBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → vbUSDT86% LLTV0x07a9…f0aeChainlink
weETHHybridRedStone / Chainlink$519,27827% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $280,087$799,36541% of vault$519,27827% of vault$280,087separate path
weETHHybridRedStone / Chainlink$519,27827% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $280,087Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → vbUSDT86% LLTV0xe892…8364RedStone / Chainlink
Oracle dependencies
2 feeds · 2 control pointsUp to$744,112drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 38% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices vbWBTC, weETH0x0787…3334$744,112 · 38% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
- RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices weETH0x3658…f9b2$280,087 · 14% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $1.94m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 11% | $222,415 | up to $1.2m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 11% | $222,415 | up to $1.2m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | |||||
| 11% | $222,415 | up to $1.2m | Instant | ||
| 11% | $222,415 | up to $1.2m | Instant | ||
| 11% | $222,415 | up to $1.2m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $744,112 | Instant | ||
| 5% | $96,610 | up to $519,278 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 7 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $969,796 | 7 days | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators1 · 1 multisigReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- 1-of-5 multisig0x40dd…b48f
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.