⌘KTry LlamaAI

Steakhouse Prime XSGD

Risk reportBase0xbeef…5fe9

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse Prime XSGD means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

13%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 6% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 3% · steakUSDC −30% 3% · cbETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 31% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink17%of vault · bad debt · $188,783Oracle exposure 2%

19%of vault · $208,63017%of vault · $188,7832%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(managed)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ XSGD86% LLTV0x14a8…292dChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$246.15m53 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 19% of the vault · $208,630

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $208,630 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

steakUSDCMarketChainlink13%of vault · bad debt · $136,324Oracle exposure 3%

16%of vault · $170,82513%of vault · $136,3243%separate path

What it's made of

steakUSDC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ XSGD92% LLTV0xf150…b5feChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$34,5352 vaultsToken:0xbeef…83b2Allocation: 16% of the vault · $170,825

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $170,825 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHHybridChainlink0.6%of vault · bad debt · $6,399Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.7%of vault · $7,1100.6%of vault · $6,3990.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbETH token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ XSGD86% LLTV0xb981…0e5aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$19.57m44 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 0.7% of the vault · $7,110

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7,110 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHHybridChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1,389Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $1,5720.1%of vault · $1,389<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ XSGD86% LLTV0xcbd6…401eChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$29.82m34 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $1,572

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,572 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $99.12Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $110.13<0.1%of vault · $99.12<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

WETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ XSGD86% LLTV0x6fde…e2a8Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$58.28m34 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $110.13

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $110.13 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $699,136 idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure64% · $699,255

64%of vault · $699,255——

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to5%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $55,254

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH, steakUSDC0xf0db…5b1b5% of vault · $55,254drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	6%	up to 31%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	6%	up to 31%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	6%	up to 31%	Instant
	6%	up to 31%	Instant
	6%	up to 31%	Instant
	—	up to 5%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0x639b…c5d6

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x639b…c5d6

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x1be9…0e36
contract0xaed2…e412
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 55min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse Prime XSGD

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle