Clearstar cbAssets Vault

Risk reportBase0x91c0…3a3c

Risk

Depositing into Clearstar cbAssets Vault means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

36%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 15% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 14% · cbETH −30% <1% · cbADA −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink77%of vault · bad debt · $23.71mOracle exposure 8%

86%of vault · $26.28m77%of vault · $23.71m8%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$182.9m74 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 86% of the vault · $26.28m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 14% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $26.28m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

SOLMarketChainlink6%of vault · bad debt · $1.76mOracle exposure 0.6%

6%of vault · $1.95m6%of vault · $1.76m0.6%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

SOL is priced via SOL / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseSOL / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xe972…5dc7Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$406,478.666 vaultsToken:0x3119…cf82Allocation: 6% of the vault · $1.95m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.95m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbADAMarketChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $719,984.83Oracle exposure 0.5%

3%of vault · $879,464.212%of vault · $719,984.830.5%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbADA is priced via ADA / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseADA / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x35d8…e45fChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$349,982.228 vaultsToken:0xcbad…7b8cAllocation: 3% of the vault · $879,464.21

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $879,464.21 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHHybridChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $608,526.8Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $669,6202%of vault · $608,526.80.2%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate) with market-rate (ETH / USD, USDC / USD) — insulated from cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, USDC / USD.

BasecbETH-ETH Exchange RateExchange rateChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x4756…9425Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$58.83m67 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 2% of the vault · $669,620

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $669,620 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbXRPMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $396,458.75Oracle exposure 0.2%

1%of vault · $455,773.921%of vault · $396,458.750.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.01m12 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 1% of the vault · $455,773.92

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $455,773.92 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

JitoSOLHybridChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $329,019.28Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $364,980.341%of vault · $329,019.280.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$92,083.336 vaultsToken:0x97be…34deAllocation: 1% of the vault · $364,980.34

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $364,980.34 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $3.08m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, cbBTC, cbETH, cbADA, SOL, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b10% of vault · $3.08mdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	15%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	15%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	15%	up to 90%	Instant
	15%	up to 90%	Instant
	15%	up to 83%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	<1%	up to 3%	Instant
	<1%	up to 3%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

decrease timelock— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner2-of-4 multisig0xb3cf…2b44

Curator2-of-4 multisig0xb3cf…2b44

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

2-of-4 multisig0x1bb2…8458

Allocators1 · 1 multisigReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-5 multisig0x40dd…b48f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 10, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql