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Gauntlet USDC RWA

Risk reportEthereum0xa887…6c45

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC RWA means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

35%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 14% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 5% · PRIME −30% 5% · AA_FalconXUSDC −30% 3% · other 2% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid30%of vault · bad debt · $3.17mOracle exposure 5%

35%of vault · $3.71m30%of vault · $3.17m5%separate path

What it's made of

AA_FalconXUSDC token page

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Room to grow: $3.71m of $20m cap (19% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.21m17 vaultsToken:0xc26a…f99cAllocation: 35% of the vault · $3.71m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.71m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink25%of vault · bad debt · $2.73mOracle exposure 3%

28%of vault · $3.03m25%of vault · $2.73m3%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Room to grow: $3.03m of $30m cap (10% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$448.27m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 28% of the vault · $3.03m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.03m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PRIMEHybridChainlink25%of vault · bad debt · $2.68mOracle exposure 3%

28%of vault · $2.96m25%of vault · $2.68m3%separate path

What it's made of

PRIME token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x999e…119aChainlink

Room to grow: $2.96m of $5m cap (59% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$20.19m14 vaultsToken:0x19eb…f7f6Allocation: 28% of the vault · $2.96m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.96m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid8%of vault · bad debt · $905,261Oracle exposure 0.9%

9%of vault · $1.01m8%of vault · $905,2610.9%separate path

What it's made of

reUSD token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Room to grow: $1.01m of $5m cap (20% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.24m21 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 9% of the vault · $1.01m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.01m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

SPYonMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $327.55Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $362.82<0.1%of vault · $327.55<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

SPYon token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x234b…ddd1Chainlink

Room to grow: $327.75 of $99,991 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$36.132 vaultsToken:0xfedc…2c08Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $362.82

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $362.82 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

QQQonMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.89Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $1.14<0.1%of vault · $0.89<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

QQQon token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78a9…a52cChainlink

Room to grow: $1.03 of $99,991 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.031 vaultsToken:0x0e39…9abaAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $1.14

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.14 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.22m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, PRIME, QQQon, USCC, SPYon0x21f7…73ca5% of vault · $576,242drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices AA_FalconXUSDC5% of vault · $545,892mispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD<1% of vault · $100,008mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	14%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	14%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	14%	up to 89%	Instant
	14%	up to 89%	Instant
	9%	up to 72%	Instant
	9%	up to 63%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-6 multisig0xc684…faec

Curator3-of-6 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-6 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x8bef…133d
contract0xfd32…c75d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 28min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC RWA

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle