KPK USDC Prime

Risk reportEthereum0x4ef5…9ee6

Risk

Depositing into KPK USDC Prime means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

37%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by WBTC −30% 7% · cbBTC −30% 4% · rETH −30% 2% · other 4% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChainlink36%of vault · bad debt · $9.67mOracle exposure 4%

41%of vault · $10.86m36%of vault · $9.67m4%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdddd…6b83Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$404.31m89 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 41% of the vault · $10.86m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 7% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $10.86m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink23%of vault · bad debt · $6.05mOracle exposure 2%

25%of vault · $6.71m23%of vault · $6.05m2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$461.98m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 25% of the vault · $6.71m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6.71m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

rETHHybridChainlink11%of vault · bad debt · $2.81mOracle exposure 1%

12%of vault · $3.11m11%of vault · $2.81m1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

rETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (rETH/ETH exchange rate adapter) with market-rate (ETH / USD, USDC / USD) — insulated from rETH/ETH exchange rate adapter market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, USDC / USD.

BaserETH/ETH exchange rate adapterExchange rateETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 23h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x36cb…f815Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$85.6m4 vaultsToken:0xae78…6393Allocation: 12% of the vault · $3.11m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.11m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $2.4mOracle exposure 1.0%

10%of vault · $2.67m9%of vault · $2.4m1.0%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDC / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDC / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x48f7…40e2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$949.75m106 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 10% of the vault · $2.67m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.67m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1.0% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

OETHMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $2.37mOracle exposure 1%

10%of vault · $2.73m9%of vault · $2.37m1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

OETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 23h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe8ad…edb0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.93m7 vaultsToken:0x856c…8dc3Allocation: 10% of the vault · $2.73m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.73m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LsETHMarketChainlink1.0%of vault · bad debt · $263,306Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $292,7171.0%of vault · $263,3060.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x377f…1c7bChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$57,0804 vaultsToken:0x8c1b…6549Allocation: 1% of the vault · $292,717

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $292,717 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink1.0%of vault · bad debt · $257,077Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $277,6871.0%of vault · $257,0770.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x0f94…4580Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.4b29 vaultsToken:0xc02a…6cc2Allocation: 1% of the vault · $277,687

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $277,687 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+3 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $2.82m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LBTC, LsETH, wstETH, WETH, weETH, tBTC, rETH, OETH0x21f7…73ca11% of vault · $2.82mdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC, weETH0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $0.000000091drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
	1%	up to 12%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
	2%	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-8 multisig0x8b88…a537

Curator2-of-5 multisig0xf818…97be

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

5-of-8 multisig0x8b88…a537

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x331d…1204
single key (EOA)0xaf15…9440
single key (EOA)0xf0cf…2a75
2-of-5 multisig0xf818…97be

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 29, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

KPK USDC Prime

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle