Yearn OG USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xb885…b069

Risk

Depositing into Yearn OG USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 19% of deposit

Driven by USD3 −30% 9% · PT-USD3-17DEC2026 −30% 6% · OETH −30% 3% · other 1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

USD3AUM / rate39%of vault · bad debt · $1.78mOracle exposure 4%

43%of vault · $1.97m39%of vault · $1.78m4%separate path

What it's made of

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x68b4…9c06

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.95m6 vaultsToken:0x056b…5eccAllocation: 43% of the vault · $1.97m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.97m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USD3-17DEC2026Hybrid31%of vault · bad debt · $1.42mOracle exposure 2%

33%of vault · $1.51m31%of vault · $1.42m2%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe5e6…8d72

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.4m6 vaultsToken:0x7f47…eb4dAllocation: 33% of the vault · $1.51m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.51m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

OETHMarketChainlink14%of vault · bad debt · $618,669Oracle exposure 3%

17%of vault · $761,05914%of vault · $618,6693%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

OETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 23h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe8ad…edb0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.17m7 vaultsToken:0x856c…8dc3Allocation: 17% of the vault · $761,059

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $761,059 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

siUSDHybrid5%of vault · bad debt · $208,925Oracle exposure 0.5%

5%of vault · $231,5565%of vault · $208,9250.5%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

siUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Chainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT Oracle, Dummy feed with 12 decimals, ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseChainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT OracleNAVQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAVBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xd2cc…fa6d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.01m17 vaultsToken:0xdbdc…9bcbAllocation: 5% of the vault · $231,556

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $231,556 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WOUSDAUM / rate2%of vault · bad debt · $68,992Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $76,7082%of vault · $68,9920.2%separate path

What it's made of

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x7c65…7d80

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$9,7564 vaultsToken:0xd2af…fa62Allocation: 2% of the vault · $76,708

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $76,708 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+10 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $452,582

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, LBTC, stcUSD, tBTC, OETH, YFI0x21f7…73ca3% of vault · $142,390drainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices USD3, WOUSD4% of vault · $194,248mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-USD3-17DEC2026, siUSD3% of vault · $115,944mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	19%	up to 90%	Instant
	19%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	<1%	up to 5%	Instant
	1%	up to 5%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xe5e2…89c0

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x90d0…6b51

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators3 · 1 contract · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x50b7…a8fa
single key (EOA)0x75a1…780d
contract0xffb8…0862

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 29, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Yearn OG USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle