Gauntlet USDT Prime

Risk reportEthereum0x8cb3…aa73

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDT Prime means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by WBTC −30% 12% · sUSDS −30% 3% · wstETH −30% 2% · other 1% · −100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChainlink63%of vault · bad debt · $4.03mOracle exposure 6%

69%of vault · $4.42m63%of vault · $4.03m6%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x008b…e1efChainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink

Room to grow: $4.42m of $699.96m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$428.85m140 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 69% of the vault · $4.42m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 12% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $4.42m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink13%of vault · bad debt · $800,892.97Oracle exposure 1%

14%of vault · $879,548.813%of vault · $800,892.971%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x95db…6992Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink

Room to grow: $879,548.8 of $699.96m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$958.73m162 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 14% of the vault · $879,548.8

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $879,548.8 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHybridChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $613,711.56Oracle exposure 0.9%

11%of vault · $672,258.6110%of vault · $613,711.560.9%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator, composite)

sUSDS mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (DAI / USD, USDT / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to DAI / USD, USDT / USD.

BaseDAI / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 25bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT97% LLTV0x1c7d…2f9cChainlink
→ USDT97% LLTV0x0c42…4c79Chainlink

Room to grow: $672,258.61 of $55m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$6.73m23 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: 11% of the vault · $672,258.61

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $672,258.61 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink6%of vault · bad debt · $382,373.6Oracle exposure 0.6%

7%of vault · $421,405.866%of vault · $382,373.60.6%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, composite, managed)

cbBTC uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x0e05…38acChainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink

Room to grow: $421,405.86 of $699.96m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$379.76m153 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 7% of the vault · $421,405.86

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $421,405.86 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $566,632.34

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, sDAI, sUSDS0x21f7…73ca9% of vault · $566,632.34drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
	2%	up to 17%	Instant
	4%	up to 16%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

remove a market— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xc684…faec

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0xc6e5…024a
contract0xfd32…c75d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 4, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql