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Total Value Hacked (USD)
$27.645bTotal Value Hacked in DeFi (USD) $9.333b
Total Value Hacked in Bridges (USD) $3.692b
As of Nov 22, 2026, losses in 2026 so far: $8.823b across 365 incidents; largest: Binance CEX ($6.36b, Oct 2026).
| Name | Chains | Classification | Technique | Description | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CyberConnect | Nov 21, 2026 | $968,000 | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Cross-Chain Message Spoofing | An attacker exploited an as-yet-unidentified authorization vulnerability affecting Cyber's cross-chain token bridge, unexpectedly minting 5.213 million CYBER on Solana and triggering the release of an equivalent amount from the Ethereum lockbox through LayerZero messaging. The attacker sold most of the released CYBER through decentralized exchanges for approximately $968K in ETH. The exact mechanism that permitted unauthorized minting and cross-chain redemption remains under investigation | ||
| Chainflip AMM | Nov 21, 2026 | $4.86m | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Solidity | An attacker drained Chainflip's Ethereum vault using a valid Schnorr signature associated with the protocol's aggregate validator signing key. The malicious transferBatch request used an anomalous nonce outside the normal signing sequence, indicating that the signature was generated outside Chainflip's usual authorization process. The attacker withdrew approximately $4.86M in ETH, USDC and USDT, converted the stablecoins to ETH, and deposited 2,909 ETH into Tornado Cash. A compromise of the validator signing system is suspected, but the exact root cause remains unconfirmed | |
| Wagyu (XMR1) | Nov 20, 2026 | $13.51m | Frontend & Infrastructure | Key Leaked via Infrastructure | An attacker reportedly obtained Wagyu's XMR1 deployer signing key through a breach of third-party hosting infrastructure that retained files from a previously deleted server. The attacker transferred 5.2M XMR1 from the deployer account to a newly created wallet and sold approximately 369,623 tokens into Hyperliquid's spot order book for $13.51M USDC, causing XMR1 to lose approximately 99.8% of its market value. The proceeds were converted into ETH and transferred across Arbitrum and Ethereum | ||
| Fluidkey | Nov 19, 2026 | — | Protocol Logic | Unknown | Fluidkey reported a security incident involving unauthorized transactions affecting users of its self-custodial privacy wallet. The team took its website, application and services offline at 18:05 UTC on November 19, after which it reported no further unauthorized transactions. Fluidkey is investigating the attack with SEAL 911 and tracing the affected funds. The attack vector and total financial losses remain undisclosed | ||
| CALC | Nov 19, 2026 | $26,900 | Frontend & Infrastructure | Key Leaked via Infrastructure | CALC reported that its operational treasury was almost entirely drained during the Web3Auth/Keplr social-login wallet compromise. A vulnerability in Web3Auth's legacy infrastructure exposed wallet signing credentials, enabling unauthorized withdrawals from affected accounts. CALC used a Keplr hot wallet to fund its off-chain infrastructure expenses and reported losing 99.9888% of its treasury, with only a small amount identified by the recovery operation | ||
| Gonka AI | Nov 18, 2026 | $1.05m | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Bridge Logic Flaw | Solidity | An attacker reportedly replaced the epoch BLS group key used by Gonka AI's Ethereum bridge to authorize cross-chain withdrawals and WGNK minting. Using the substituted signing authority, the attacker executed unauthorized withdrawals that depleted the bridge's remaining USDT and USDC reserves and minted WGNK without corresponding GNK escrow on Gonka. The incident resulted in approximately $1.05M–$1.06M in reported losses, while the mechanism that allowed the unauthorized group-key replacement remains under investigation | |
| RNT Lend | Nov 18, 2026 | $954,703 | Key Compromise | Private Key Compromised | Solidity | An attacker used a privileged Reental administrator account to upgrade RNT Lend's USDT0 and USDC aToken proxies to malicious implementations permitting unrestricted withdrawals. Two MEV bots exploited the upgraded contracts to drain approximately $454.8K in stablecoin reserves, while the administrator account extracted another $499.9K from Reental-associated wallets and Safes. Approximately $49.34M in property tokens was also transferred but subsequently reclaimed by Reental using its token manager | |
| K3 Capital | Nov 18, 2026 | $3.42m | Token & Share Accounting | Incorrect Share Accounting | Solidity | Attackers exploited an accounting discrepancy in K3 Capital's sBOLD vault that excluded WETH collateral below a configured threshold from share valuations. Using flash-loaned capital, they minted sBOLD shares while the collateral was undervalued, triggered swaps that converted the uncounted collateral into BOLD, and redeemed their shares at the increased valuation. Repeating this process across 97 transactions drained approximately $3.42M in BOLD from the vault. | |
| Peapods Finance | Nov 18, 2026 | — | Key Compromise | Deployer Key Compromised | Solidity | Peapods Finance reported a suspected compromise of its deployer key, which was used to assign minting permissions on L2 PEAS contracts. The attacker minted unauthorized PEAS, bridged the tokens to Ethereum mainnet, and sold them into market liquidity. The team removed approximately 98–99% of L2 liquidity to limit further losses and warned users to withdraw LP and leveraged yield farming positions while investigating the compromise | |
| LUKSO | Nov 18, 2026 | $496,000 | Access Control | Improper Access Control | Between November 17 and 18, 2026, an attacker exploited a security vulnerability in the backend of LUKSO's email-based Universal Profile recovery service, gaining unauthorized control over approximately 300 user accounts. The attacker abused the recovery service's permissions to add a malicious controller key to affected profiles and withdraw approximately 1.4 million LYX. The stolen tokens were subsequently bridged to Ethereum and exchanged for approximately 50 ETH ($95,000). LUKSO disabled the compromised recovery service, confirmed that its blockchain and Universal Profile smart contracts were unaffected, and began developing a reimbursement solution for affected users | ||
| B18 TimeBank | Nov 17, 2026 | $404,540 | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On November 17, 2026, an attacker exploited B18 TimeBank's level-reward voucher redemption mechanism on Base, withdrawing approximately $404,540 in USDC from the protocol's settlement contract. The attacker redeemed signed reward vouchers to trigger the unauthorized withdrawal in a single identified transaction | ||
| Lighter Perps | Nov 16, 2026 | $10.39m | Frontend & Infrastructure | API Key Compromised | On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a leaked API key belonging to a trader on Lighter, enabling unauthorized activity that resulted in the withdrawal of approximately 10.39 million USDC from the platform. The stolen funds were transferred to an attacker-controlled Ethereum wallet, exchanged for ETH through CoW Swap, and partially routed to Hyperliquid. Lighter confirmed that its protocol and smart contracts were not compromised, temporarily suspended withdrawals and liquidity pool creation, and activated Guardian mode to prevent further unauthorized withdrawals. An additional attempted withdrawal remained under investigation, with the full scope and recovery status unconfirmed | ||
| MORE Markets | Nov 16, 2026 | $308,000 | Protocol Logic | Unknown | Solidity | On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited MORE Markets on Flow EVM, draining approximately $308,000 in WFLOW from its lending reserve. The attacker used flash loans to establish e-mode positions involving ankrFLOW and WFLOW, then repeatedly self-liquidated those positions, leaving unbacked WFLOW debt in the protocol | |
| Optimizely (OPTIMJACK) | Nov 16, 2026 | $2,260 | Frontend & Infrastructure | Supply Chain Attack | JavaScript | On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's web experimentation platform to inject malicious JavaScript into scripts used by 178 organizations, including Ledger, HSBC, BBC and Zoom. The injected code replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting approximately $2,260 in suspected victim payments across Bitcoin, Litecoin, Tron, Ethereum and BSC. The malware also attempted to steal payment-card information, cookies and screenshots, and delivered exploit kits targeting iOS devices. Optimizely removed the injected code and patched the vulnerability, while the full extent of data theft and additional financial losses remained unknown | |
| Chain Games | Nov 15, 2026 | $20,000 | Protocol Logic | Reward Logic Flaw | On November 15, 2026, attackers exploited a reward accounting flaw in Chain Games' delegation staking contracts on Polygon, stealing approximately 37.98 million CHAIN ($20,000). The contracts failed to synchronize reward checkpoints during share transfers, allowing attackers to repeatedly claim historical rewards through restake() and inflate their staking positions over 360 cycles. The inflated shares were subsequently redeemed for CHAIN from the staking pool. Chain Games disabled delegation across its validators and committed to fully compensating affected stakers and delegators | ||
| Luxor Commander | Nov 15, 2026 | — | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On November 15, 2026 (UTC), attackers compromised Luxor Technology's Commander mining-fleet management platform and redirected Bitcoin mining hashrate from more than a dozen client accounts to the OCEAN mining pool using an attacker-designated payout address. Approximately 13 EH/s of mining power was affected, generating unauthorized Bitcoin mining rewards of an undetermined total value. Luxor patched the vulnerability within two hours of detection, began restoring affected mining configurations and committed to fully compensating impacted clients. The underlying vulnerability remains undisclosed, while Luxor confirmed that its mining pool and LuxOS firmware were unaffected | ||
| Hyprearn Perps | Nov 14, 2026 | — | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On November 14, 2026, HyprEarn disclosed reports of unauthorized trading activity affecting a small number of Hyperliquid accounts that had previously authorized its API agent wallets. The team revoked its existing trading agents on its side and instructed affected users to remove their approvals directly through Hyperliquid before authorizing replacement agents. Because the agents could execute trades but not withdraw assets, any financial impact would have resulted from unauthorized trading activity rather than direct wallet withdrawals. The cause of the activity, number of affected accounts and total losses remain undisclosed. | ||
| Kava Lend | Nov 14, 2026 | $3.7m | Token & Share Accounting | Arithmetic Error | Go | On November 14, 2026, attackers exploited an arithmetic flaw in Kava Lend's BUSD market that allowed its supply interest index to increase approximately 243,000-fold when calculated against an extremely small effective supply. The attackers used the resulting inflated collateral claims to repeatedly borrow KAVA, then liquidated the loans through a process that erased the debt without recovering sufficient collateral. Approximately 53.9 million KAVA, worth $3.7 million before the subsequent market selloff, was stolen from the lending protocol. The attackers bridged and sold much of the stolen KAVA on BNB Chain, while approximately 612,416 USDT in laundering proceeds was blocked at the Relay bridge | |
| Pennysia | Nov 13, 2026 | $5,131 | Access Control | Arbitrary External Call | Solidity | On November 12, 2026, an attacker exploited an arbitrary external call vulnerability in Pennysia's Settlement contract on Ethereum, stealing approximately $5,131 from four users. The attacker deployed malicious tokens to bypass spending checks in the executeSwap() function, then abused existing ERC-20 allowances to transfer USDC, wstETH and YUNO directly from users' wallets through the vulnerable contract | |
| Edel | Nov 12, 2026 | $300,000 | Protocol Logic | Unknown | In November 2026, Edel Finance reported that approximately $300,000 worth of EDEL tokens had been stolen and sold on the market. The team began investigating the theft and coordinating with authorities and cryptocurrency exchanges to trace the stolen assets and block the attackers. The source of the stolen tokens, initial attack method, affected blockchain and recovery status remain undisclosed. | ||
| Rujira AMM Strategies | Nov 11, 2026 | $200,000 | Protocol Logic | Swap Logic Flaw | On November 10, 2026, an attacker exploited a flaw in the skew calculations of Rujira's Custom Concentrated Liquidity (CCL) strategy on THORChain, manipulating trading activity in the BTC/USDC orderbook and imbalancing existing liquidity positions. The exploit caused approximately $200,000 in losses, including $175,000 from Liquidy Finance's positions and $25,000 from other users. Rujira halted the CosmWasm application layer and announced plans to remove the vulnerable skew parameter and fully reimburse affected users before resuming operations | ||
| Curve Finance (CowSwapBurner) | Nov 10, 2026 | $38,206 | Input Validation | Signature Verification Flaw | Vyper | On November 10, 2026, an attacker exploited a signature verification flaw in Curve Finance's CowSwapBurner contract on Ethereum, stealing approximately $38,206 in accumulated DAO fee revenue. The contract's isValidSignature() function validated an order description without verifying that it matched the order hash being executed, allowing the attacker to submit 138 fraudulent CoW Protocol orders and redirect proceeds from 135 fee tokens to their own address. Curve's Emergency DAO disabled the affected burner later that day and proposed replacing it with a contract that correctly validates order hashes. No user funds were affected, and the stolen revenue has not been recovered | |
| Arcus Perps | Nov 10, 2026 | $2.23m | Protocol Logic | Withdrawal Logic Flaw | On November 10, 2026 (UTC), an attacker exploited an accounting flaw in Arcus Perps on Robinhood Chain that allowed transfers between subaccounts to artificially inflate an account's recorded balance. The attacker used the inflated balance to withdraw 2,234,391 USDG, while an additional $3 million in withdrawal requests was blocked by the bridge's rate limit and later reversed. Arcus patched the vulnerability, restricted the exploiter's accounts, and covered the entire shortfall from its company treasury, leaving user balances unaffected | ||
| Across | Nov 10, 2026 | — | Frontend & Infrastructure | DNS Hijack | On November 10, 2026, an attacker compromised Across Protocol's domain through a social engineering attack targeting its registrar, Namecheap, redirecting users to a malicious website designed to steal cryptocurrency through fraudulent wallet interactions. Multiple users reported unauthorized withdrawals after interacting with the compromised interface. Across took its frontend and API offline, worked to block access to the malicious domain, and committed to compensating affected users. The total amount stolen remains undisclosed | ||
| Initia | Nov 10, 2026 | $615,000 | Key Compromise | Private Key Compromised | On November 10, 2026, an attacker used compromised rollup infrastructure keys to fabricate IBC transfers and withdraw assets from escrow accounts on Initia's Layer 1 that held funds bridged to multiple rollups. Approximately $615,000 in assets, including 605,000 USDC, was transferred out through Noble before validators halted the Initia network at 06:18 UTC. Additional assets were moved from the affected escrow accounts but remained on the halted blockchain. Initia began investigating the compromise with security teams and exchanges, while the full scope of the incident and recovery status remained undetermined | ||
| Ankr Bridge | Nov 9, 2026 | $304,500 | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Cross-Chain Message Spoofing | On November 9, 2026, an attacker exploited Ankr's cross-chain bridge on Ethereum by submitting five forged withdrawal receipts referencing a single Optimism deposit that had already been redeemed. The attacker modified the recipients, assets, and withdrawal amounts, while presenting valid signatures from the bridge's trusted consensus signer. The bridge accepted the falsified receipts and released approximately $304,500 in assets, including ankrETH, ankrPOL, ANKR, and other staking tokens. The origin of the unauthorized signatures remains under investigation | ||
| LNbits | Nov 8, 2026 | — | Protocol Logic | Unknown | Python | On November 8, 2026, attackers exploited vulnerabilities in LNbits, an open-source Bitcoin Lightning wallet management platform, to create unauthorized accounts and withdraw funds from affected installations. One confirmed operator reported losing 2,285,545 satoshis, while the aggregate loss across other instances remained undisclosed. LNbits instructed operators to shut down their servers and subsequently released version 1.7.0 on November 10 to address the vulnerabilities. The project also advised operators to rotate wallet keys and funding-source credentials, with the exact attack mechanism pending a full technical report | |
| ACryptoS | Nov 8, 2026 | $665,429 | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | Solidity | On November 8, 2026, attackers exploited a missing input validation check in ACryptoS's concentrated-liquidity vaults across Arbitrum, BSC, Polygon, Base, and Optimism, stealing approximately $665,429 from 77 vaults. The vulnerable depositMulti() function accepted an incomplete token-amount array, causing the vault to undervalue its existing assets and mint disproportionately large amounts of shares for minimal deposits | |
| LiquidCore | Nov 7, 2026 | $136,664 | Key Compromise | Deployer Key Compromised | Solidity | On November 7, 2026, an attacker reportedly compromised a LiquidCore deployer wallet and used its upgrade privileges to modify two liquidity pool contracts on HyperEVM. The attacker subsequently drained approximately $136,664 in USDâ‚®0, WHYPE and UETH from the affected pools. The stolen assets were transferred to an attacker-controlled address and subsequently routed through cross-chain services, including Mayan and LI.FI. The extent of the deployer-key compromise, recovery status and plans to reimburse affected liquidity providers remain unconfirmed | |
| Keplr Wallet (Web3Auth) | Nov 6, 2026 | — | Frontend & Infrastructure | Key Leaked via Infrastructure | In November 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Web3Auth's infrastructure that exposed private keys belonging to Keplr wallets created using Google or Apple login, allowing unauthorized transactions from affected accounts. Web3Auth and Keplr suspended the affected services and initiated a recovery operation using the same vulnerability to transfer approximately $5.6 million from exposed wallets into secure addresses before attackers could steal the funds. The total amount stolen before the recovery operation remains undisclosed, and the teams are working to return the secured assets to their owners | ||
| TENDRIL | Nov 5, 2026 | $550,000 | Protocol Logic | Swap Logic Flaw | Solidity | On November 5, 2026, an attacker exploited TENDRIL's token sell logic to drain approximately 550,000 USDT from its PancakeSwap V2 liquidity pool on BSC. Each sell triggered PoolControl.sellToken(), which called TENDRIL.controlburn() to burn tokens directly from the liquidity pair and synchronize its reserves before the seller's remaining tokens arrived. The attacker used flash-loan-funded transactions to exploit the resulting reserve imbalance and withdraw nearly all the pool's USDT liquidity. ExVul estimated the attacker's campaign profit at no more than 181,910 USDT after observed purchases and gas costs, excluding an unresolved LP-position basis | |
| Loopscale Lending | Nov 5, 2026 | — | Protocol Logic | Unknown | In late October and early November 2026, Loopscale was targeted by a sustained attack campaign involving more than 30,000 malicious API requests per day, primarily directed at its SOL and USDC Genesis Vaults on Solana. On November 5, the protocol paused operations after detecting an escalation in the activity. Loopscale stated that the affected vaults had been made whole and that no user deposits incurred losses, but did not disclose whether funds had been stolen or explain the attack mechanism. The protocol remained paused pending further investigation and security improvements | ||
| DeFiChain | Nov 3, 2026 | — | Token & Share Accounting | Arithmetic Error | C++ | An attacker exploited an arithmetic overflow in DeFiChain's native account-to-account transfer mechanism, causing the blockchain to deduct only one satoshi of DFI from the sender while crediting recipients with the full transfer amounts. The vulnerability was exploited at least twice, creating approximately 184.47 billion unauthorized DFI across two addresses, more than 140 times the intended maximum supply. The development contributors contacted declined to implement a fix or rollback, leaving the vulnerability and inflated supply unaddressed | |
| Mercado Bitcoin | Nov 2, 2026 | $40m | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On November 2, 2026, attackers compromised a system at Mercado Bitcoin and transferred more than $40 million in crypto from exchange-associated wallets across various blockchains. The exchange contained the incident and temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals while investigating the transfers. Tether froze more than $4.5 million USDT associated with the theft. Mercado Bitcoin stated that customers would not incur losses and that no customer data was exposed | ||
| BitMart | Nov 2, 2026 | $391,000 | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On November 2, 2026, attackers breached BitMart and transferred approximately $391,000 in cryptocurrency from exchange-associated wallets on Base, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Blockchain investigators traced portions of the stolen funds to addresses associated with the Mercado Bitcoin exploit, which occurred on the same day. BitMart founder Sheldon Xia confirmed the breach and said the exchange had investigated the incident and strengthened its security measures. The initial access method remains unidentified | ||
| BTCPay Server | Nov 1, 2026 | — | Frontend & Infrastructure | Key Leaked via Infrastructure | On November 1, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in BTCPay Server versions 2.4.1 and earlier to compromise self-hosted installations and steal BTC and LTC from their hot wallets. The vulnerability had been patched in version 2.4.2 in August, but outdated installations remained exposed. BTCPay Server urged affected operators to take their servers offline, migrate to fresh installations, replace compromised wallet seeds, and rotate potentially exposed credentials. Wallets whose spending keys were held off-server, including hardware wallets, were unaffected | ||
| Sovryn Dex | Nov 1, 2026 | $538,749 | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On November 1, 2026, an attacker exploited Sovryn's XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool on Rootstock, receiving approximately 541,456 XUSD ($538,749) in an attacker-controlled wallet. Portions of the proceeds were subsequently converted into BTC and ETH, while other assets remained under protocol control. Sovryn implemented emergency fee-control changes, delisted the affected pool on November 2, and began reconciling the impact on liquidity providers. The underlying vulnerability and final realized losses remain under investigation | ||
| Premia V3 | Nov 1, 2026 | $437,000 | Protocol Logic | Withdrawal Logic Flaw | Solidity | ||
| Sovryn Lend | Oct 31, 2026 | $914,000 | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On October 31, 2026, attackers exploited Sovryn's lending and margin contracts on Rootstock through three transactions, extracting approximately $914,000 in XUSD and WRBTC. Sovryn paused its core protocol and lending pools after detecting the incident. A 24-hour withdrawal delay enabled the team to block seven additional withdrawals totaling approximately 66,134 XUSD before the funds reached the attackers. The underlying vulnerability remains undisclosed while the team completes security repairs and reconciles affected positions | ||
| b14g | Oct 31, 2026 | — | Protocol Logic | Unknown | On October 31, 2026, an attacker withdrew approximately 97 million CORE from assets staked through b14g and transferred them to attacker-controlled addresses. The protocol paused the affected contracts and coordinated with security partners and exchanges to trace the stolen funds. Approximately 68 million CORE remained on Core, while exchanges froze another 9 million CORE. BTC staked through b14g was unaffected and remained time-locked on Bitcoin | ||
| Troves | Oct 31, 2026 | $666,935 | Access Control | Improper Access Control | On October 31, an attacker exploited permissions retained by a legacy rebalancing contract after it had been replaced, resulting in approximately 8.6 BTC in losses from Troves' xWBTC/WBTC vault. Troves revoked the legacy contract's permissions and paused three vaults as a precaution. No impact on other vaults has been identified | ||
| Polymarket International | Oct 29, 2026 | $2.7m | Frontend & Infrastructure | Supply Chain Attack | JavaScript | Attackers reportedly compromised a third-party website monitoring service used by Polymarket, allowing malicious JavaScript to execute on its international trading platform. The script hijacked authenticated trading sessions to sell prediction-market positions and transfer assets to attacker-controlled wallets. Polymarket temporarily suspended trading, removed the affected integration, and committed to reimbursing impacted users | |
| Binance CEX | Oct 29, 2026 | $6.36b | Frontend & Infrastructure | Key Leaked via Infrastructure | On October 29, attackers exploited Binance’s operational infrastructure to execute unauthorized withdrawals across multiple blockchains, resulting in approximately $6.3 billion in losses. Binance’s preliminary investigation identified a potentially compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop that allowed access to a service container, with no evidence of wallet private key leakage. Approximately $3 billion in stolen assets were later frozen with help from industry partners. Binance committed to covering all losses using its SAFU fund and company reserves | ||
| zkLink Nova | Oct 28, 2026 | $783,100 | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Cross-Chain Message Spoofing | Solidity | An attacker exploited zkLink’s Arbitrator contract, which failed to clear a previously authenticated message hash after processing a claim. By reusing that hash through the publicly accessible SyncL2TxHashRelayer, the attacker impersonated an authorized gateway message and installed a malicious L2 logs root. The attacker then submitted forged withdrawal proofs against the compromised root to drain approximately $783,100 from zkLink’s Ethereum bridge | |
| Hifi Finance | Oct 28, 2026 | — | Governance | Malicious Proposal | Solidity | An attacker acquired HIFI governance tokens and used four coordinated votes shortly before voting closed to pass a malicious governance proposal. Proposal 21 would upgrade Hifi’s BalanceSheet contract to introduce a function that incorrectly treats existing collateral as untracked funds, allowing it to be transferred to an attacker-controlled Safe. The proposal would also mint 25 million HIFI tokens to the attacker. At the time of reporting, the proposal was queued but had not been executed | |
| Fence Finance | Oct 27, 2026 | $1.01m | Token & Share Accounting | Incorrect Share Accounting | Solidity | An attacker exploited a tranche vault associated with Fence Finance and Valinor Digital by using a flash loan to obtain an inflated allocation of vault shares. The attacker subsequently redeemed those shares to withdraw approximately $1.01 million in USDC from the vault | |
| Zilliqa X-Bridge | Oct 27, 2026 | — | Key Compromise | Private Key Compromised | Zilliqa confirmed a security incident affecting its X-Bridge and ZRC2 proxy contracts associated with certain liquidity pools, including PlunderSwap. The affected assets include zUSDT, SEED, kUSD, and Zoge, while native ZIL and the Zilliqa EVM network reportedly remain unaffected. X-Bridge remains paused while operational keys are rotated and investigations continue | ||
| Predict Fun | Oct 27, 2026 | $400,000 | Frontend & Infrastructure | Frontend Compromise | Several Predict.fun users experienced unauthorized wallet transfers totaling approximately 400,000 USDT. Preliminary findings suggest a possible compromise of the project’s API documentation website, which was hosted by a third-party provider. Predict.fun took the documentation site offline as a precaution and committed to reimbursing affected users | ||
| Bloom Trading Bot | Oct 26, 2026 | $953,000 | Frontend & Infrastructure | Supply Chain Attack | An attacker exploited a reported remote code execution vulnerability in a third-party software module used by Bloom’s trading infrastructure, enabling unauthorized transfers from user wallets. Approximately 9,408 SOL was drained from 48 wallets belonging to nine traders within 94 seconds. Bloom attributed the incident to the third-party module and denied that private keys were exposed, while Bitquery confirmed that the transactions were signed using the affected wallets’ keys | ||
| Myriad Markets | Oct 26, 2026 | $0 | Frontend & Infrastructure | Key Leaked via Infrastructure | An attacker exploited a previously exposed private key belonging to Myriad’s automated market management wallet. The key had reportedly been leaked through a vulnerability in a third-party library used by a backend service. The attacker used the wallet’s privileges to manipulate positions and force incorrect resolutions across 10 prediction markets on BNB Chain. Myriad revoked the wallet’s permissions, secured the remaining funds, and announced that all affected markets would be voided and users refunded |