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Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk reportMonad0x7899…f371

Risk

Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

34%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 11% of deposit

Driven by aHYPER −30% 6% · PT-USDat-14JAN2027 −30% 4% · aHyperBTC −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

aHYPERHybrid69%of vault · bad debt · $24.74mOracle exposure 7%

76%of vault · $27.17m69%of vault · $24.74m7%separate path

What it's made of

aHYPER token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

aHYPER is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg rather than a direct market-rate feed.

BaseExchange-rate/NAV pricing legQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x4af4…fbec

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.99m2 vaultsToken:0x7cd2…5e59Allocation: 76% of the vault · $27.17m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $27.17m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-14JAN2027Unclassified17%of vault · bad debt · $6.23mOracle exposure 2%

19%of vault · $6.87m17%of vault · $6.23m2%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USDat-14JAN2027 token page

Unclassified(custom)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x5979…dab2

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.73m4 vaultsToken:0xa08a…c147Allocation: 19% of the vault · $6.87m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6.87m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

aHyperBTCMarketChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $1.6mOracle exposure 0.4%

5%of vault · $1.76m4%of vault · $1.6m0.4%separate path

What it's made of

aHyperBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xc30a…5c6eChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1m4 vaultsToken:0xc6de…8168Allocation: 5% of the vault · $1.76m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.76m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink0.3%of vault · bad debt · $117,816Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.3%of vault · $124,0170.3%of vault · $117,816<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf423…d329Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$21.19m9 vaultsToken:0x10ae…5417Allocation: 0.3% of the vault · $124,017

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $124,017 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHYPERHybrid0.1%of vault · bad debt · $30,563Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $32,8630.1%of vault · $30,563<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

mHYPER token page

Hybrid(managed)

mHYPER uses a managed oracle path; verified external provider(s): no verified external provider.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x3a89…1e9c

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2,2022 vaultsToken:0xd90f…e4e7Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $32,863

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $32,863 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+7 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $3.25m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices WMON, wstETH, WETH, aHyperBTC, WBTC, mHyperBTC, cbBTC0x7387…c4f1<1% of vault · $166,450drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices aHYPER7% of vault · $2.44mmispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-USDat-14JAN2027, mHYPER2% of vault · $642,179mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	11%	up to 91%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	11%	up to 91%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	11%	up to 91%	Instant
	11%	up to 91%	Instant
	7%	up to 76%	Instant
	6%	up to 69%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Sentinels11 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0x5d7a…3a7e

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x0a50…a662
single key (EOA)0x345e…3c5f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xe27f…e558

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 43min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle