Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk reportMonad0x7899…f371

Risk

Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$10.01mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $31.45mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $2.6m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by aHYPER $2.54m · mHYPER $38,920 · WBTC $15,425 · other $6,503 · −100% $28.51m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

aHYPERHybrid$27.96m89% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $2.6m

$30.56m97% of vault$27.96m89% of vault$2.6mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

aHYPER is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg rather than a direct market-rate feed.

BaseExchange-rate/NAV pricing legQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x4af4…fbec

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.63m2 vaultsToken:0x7cd2…5e59Allocation: $30.56m · 97% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $2.54mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $30.56m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $2.6m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHYPERHybrid$428,1181% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $39,770

$467,8881% of vault$428,1181% of vault$39,770separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)

mHYPER uses a managed oracle path; verified external provider(s): no verified external provider.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x3a89…1e9c

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$39,7722 vaultsToken:0xd90f…e4e7Allocation: $467,888 · 1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $38,920Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $467,888 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $39,770 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$82,9070.3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $17,082

$99,9890.3% of vault$82,9070.3% of vault$17,082separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xff07…26f5Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.07m9 vaultsToken:0x0555…2b9cAllocation: $99,989 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $15,425Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $99,989 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $17,082 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink$19,9450.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $3,040

$22,9850.1% of vault$19,9450.1% of vault$3,040separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf423…d329Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10.48m9 vaultsToken:0x10ae…5417Allocation: $22,985 · 0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $3,711Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $22,985 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $3,040 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$10,360<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $54,407

$64,7670.2% of vault$10,360<0.1% of vault$54,407separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf06b…5396Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$5.21m8 vaultsToken:0xee8c…1242Allocation: $64,767 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1,928Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $64,767 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $54,407 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink$9,512<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $90,477

$99,9890.3% of vault$9,512<0.1% of vault$90,477separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x0c68…5836Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$839,7955 vaultsToken:0xd18b…414bAllocation: $99,989 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $864.71Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $99,989 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $90,477 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$2.8mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 9% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices WMON, wstETH, WETH, WBTC, cbBTC0x7387…c4f1$165,006 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices aHYPER$2.6m · 8% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices mHYPER$39,770 · <1% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$31.45m	Full deposit	Instant
	8%	$2.6m	up to $28.51m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	8%	$2.6m	up to $28.51m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	8%	$2.6m	up to $28.51m	Instant
	8%	$2.6m	up to $28.51m	Instant
	8%	$2.58m	up to $28.39m	Instant
	—	—	up to $2.8m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $15.72m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x345e…3c5f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xe27f…e558

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql